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Introduction 
The July 2014 issue of the Brazilian journal Política Externa carried as its cover 
story interviews with the leading presidential candidates in the October vote. As the 
editors explain, a set of questions were sent to the then three main candidates, Dilma 
Rousseff of the PT, Aécio Neves of the PSDB and Eduardo Campos of the PSB. The 
most revealing aspect of the exercise was not the answers to the questions, but the 
failure again of a leading candidate to respond to the electoral engagement of Brazil‟s 
highest profile foreign policy journal. Unfortunately, far from breaking new ground, 
Dilma‟s seeming disinterest in 2014 simply mirrored the 2010 PSDB candidate Jose 
Serra‟s non-participation. 
Although disappointing for the international relations specialist, the decision by 
Dilma in2014 and Serra in 2010 to not engage with the journal is hardly surprising if we 
pause to consider the domestic political weight foreign policy carries in Brazil. The 
subject rarely appears as a matter for serious debate in the mainstream news cycle and 
has made only passing appearances in previous electoral contests, most visibly in 2006 
when Lula had to address his reaction to Bolivia‟s nationalization of Petrobras gas 
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assets. Little help comes from the media, with foreign policy being noticeable for its 
absence in the questions posed during the first televised presidential debate in 2014. 
Disinterest is similarly evident when it comes time for a newly elected president to form 
their cabinet. While members of the president‟s congressional coalition hotly contest 
portfolios such as finance, agriculture or planning, the foreign ministry is all-but 
ignored and left as a technocratic post for a seasoned diplomat. Matters are scarcely 
better in Congress where at least the public portion of Committee hearings with 
Itamaraty officials is generally formulaic and dominated by ritual statements of respect 
and admiration for the foreign ministry. 
The subtext to this reflexive political indifference to foreign affairs is that things 
international are not viewed as terribly important policy areas by many Brazilians and 
thus offer minimal returns and opportunities for career politicians, an attitude often 
justified through reference to the professionalism and confidence in the diplomats at 
Itamaraty. At its core the problem is that connections between the external and domestic 
are rarely direct and the lasting and meaningful returns (and costs) of foreign policy 
initiatives are seldom immediate. The challenge this creates for the victor in the October 
ballot is to make foreign policy – particularly high-level conceptual understandings –
politically relevant to a wider group of actors and further democratize this often 
aristocratically-minded policy space (Lopes, 2013).This is not to suggest foreign affairs 
should be thrown into the cauldron of partisan politics, but rather to point out that 
events outside Brazil do increasingly matter for the daily lives of Brazilians and that the 
substance, formulation and implementation of foreign policy have real consequences 
even if they are often distanced by at least one degree of separation from daily reality in 
the country.  
A key theme that will run through this short article is the tendency for 
democratic Brazil‟s foreign policy to follow a path dictated by its own momentum and 
traditions, usually experiencing major rethinks and revisions only at the direct and 
enforced instigation of the president. Rather than looking at specific issues, this paper 
will instead focus on one high-level conceptual theme – sovereignty and autonomy in 
Brazilian foreign policy – to point out why there is a need for greater political and 
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societal discussion of core concepts and principals in foreign policy in addition to the 
more transactional and tactical elements of international affairs. The assumption in the 
article, and this is certainly contestable, is that the complexity of the global economy 
and society not only makes widespread political neglect of foreign policy a risky 
tradition to continue, but also reduces the range and subtlety of options that might be 
envisioned and pursued to best take advantage of new and existing challenges and 
opportunities. This assumption is also not held to be unique to Brazil, but applies to any 
country engaged (willingly or unwillingly) in the international system. It is, however, 
more pressing for Brazil if the trajectory of expanded and enhanced international 
interaction built during the Cardoso and Lula presidencies is to continue. 
 
South America, Sovereignty and Autonomy 
One possible interpretation of the Brazilian foreign policy priorities of defending 
the norm of sovereignty and the preservation of national autonomy is that they are 
grounded in defensive fear. In the early Twentieth Century the patron of Brazilian 
foreign policy, the Baron of Rio Branco Jose Maria de Silva Paranhos, Junior, built a 
foreign policy around approximation with the United States in order to deploy the 
Monroe Doctrine as a defensive shield to ward off potentially predatory European 
powers thinking of annexing parts of Brazil. In the early 1990s a similar sort of concern 
was at play, only this time it focused on deflecting US interventionist attention away 
from Brazil. The comprehensive foreign policy review ordered by Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso when he was foreign minister makes clear mention of recent US interventions 
in Panama, Haiti and Peru before turning to highlight the extent to which issues such as 
human rights, narcotrafficking and the environment were increasingly being seen in 
Washington as appropriate grounds for external intervention (IPRI, 1993: 52-53). 
Serious questions were consequently raised about how these external pressures would 
limit Brazil‟s domestic policy autonomy and ability to influence continental agendas. 
For Vigevani and Cepaluni (2009) the chosen policy response can be summarized as a 
foreign policy of „autonomy through participation‟, meaning that active engagement 
with regional and international instruments was selected as the best way to avoid 
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precedents that could be used at a later date to restrict the Brazilian government‟s 
domestic and foreign policy options.  
For much of the 1990s there was little contradiction between the pursuit of 
autonomy through participation and Brazil‟s capabilities to lead in a traditional sense. 
Although Cardoso‟s presidency did see considerable efforts to construct a South 
American space and get neighboring countries to buy into his government‟s vision of a 
consensual hegemony (Burges, 2008), much of this was done on the „cheap‟ and relied 
heavily on ideas and dialogue, not the sort of concrete resources needed to anchor 
regionalist projects such as the European Union (Mattli, 1999). In many respects Lula 
doubled down on Cardoso‟s South American project and actively sought to expand 
Brazilian leadership in the region and throughout the global South. Pan-continental 
summitry took off and infrastructure integration transmogrified first into the 
Community of South American Nations (CASA) and then the Union of South American 
Nations (Unasul). More interesting for neighboring countries contemplating Brazilian 
regional leadership was that domestic economic stability in Brazil towards the end of 
Lula‟s first term suggested a deepening of the consensual hegemonic project through 
expanded economic assistance and a more active continental management position. By 
the time Lula second term was drawing near clear signals welcoming active Brazilian 
leadership were starting to emerge, with Peruvian president Alan García noting: “We 
have no apprehension or fear of positive, constructive hegemony from Brazil, which has 
an essential role as a promoter of the South American Union” (Ferreyros, 2006). 
Although it is often officially disavowed, Brazil has taken a somewhat muscular 
leadership role in South America, even if it almost always routes these activities 
through the weak multilateral groupings it has brought into existence or keeps in its 
back pocket. The South American Defense Council was used to defuse a potential 
Ecuador/Venezuela-Colombia war after a FARC rebel base in Ecuadorean territory was 
attacked by the Colombian military in 2008. Attempts by the US to create a pan-
American democratic oversight mechanism at the 2005 Organization of American 
States General Assembly were derailed by a proposal channeled through the nearly 
defunct Latin American trade grouping ALADI. Impatient Paraguayan political 
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manipulators who impeached President Lugo with needless speed and indecorum in 
2012 were soundly disciplined through their country‟s political suspension from 
Mercosul and Unasul. The point of this rapid survey is two-fold. First, Brazilian foreign 
policy has a definite agenda and forcefully advances it. Second, Brazil goes to great 
pains to collectivize its position and thus deflect some of the responsibility for it. 
It is in the ambiguous acknowledgement of a desire for a leadership role and the 
collectivization of leadership actions that problems arise for the small community of 
Brazilian foreign policy makers and implementers. Once the politeness of diplomatic 
protocol is scraped away, it quickly becomes evident that there is regional 
disappointment with how Brazil conducts itself in the region – the abstracted muscular 
leadership noted above – as well as the failure to actually lead the region forward and 
provide the level of positive leadership goods sought by neighboring countries. Indeed, 
language often directed at the USA has started to enter into the lexicon of works 
analyzing and commenting on Brazil‟s relations with South America, the most direct 
being suggestions of imperialism and policy suggestions of balancing against Brazil 
(Flynn, 2007; Charleaux, 2008; Goodman, 2009; Mesa, 2011; Flemes and Wojczewski, 
2011; Deo, 2012; Flemes and Whener, 2013; Visentini, 2014: 42). 
In short, the problem for the regional ambitions set for Brazil as far back as the 
Collor presidency is that the expanded leadership some countries were signaling as 
acceptable around 2006 was not forthcoming. Drawing on this disjuncture Malamud 
(2011) aptly labeled Brazil “a leader without followers.” While there was some quiet 
transfer of financial and technical assistance to the region through mechanisms like 
BNDES export financing, South-South technical cooperation and the Mercosul 
Structural Convergence Fund, these activities did not reach a level that could be equated 
with an economic anchoring of a region or sub-region. Matters were further eroded by a 
two-fold political problem grounded in the applied understanding of defending 
autonomy that eroded the willingness to follow Brazil‟s lead. First, was the sense in 
some sectors of an ideological capriciousness in the contrasting approaches towards 
political tensions in Cuba and Venezuela and the response to Lugo‟s deposal in 
Paraguay. More serious was the second, namely an unwillingness to invest political and 
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economic capital in the creation of substantive regional governance institutions, which 
might also at some future date be used to restrain Brazil or limit Brazilian autonomy. 
Although Brazil has finally succeeded at expanding Mercosul with the entry of 
Venezuela and the imminent accession of Bolivia and Ecuador, in many important 
respects the bloc as well as Unasul and CELAC remain paper tigers. Despite nearly two 
decades of formal operation, the institutions at the heart of Mercosul remain relatively 
powerless and disputes frequently go straight to the desk of the member-country 
presidents rather than being addressed in empowered forums such as the bloc‟s dispute 
resolution mechanism or parliament (Malamud and Dri, 2013). Emerging efforts to 
manage transnational criminal networks – perhaps the biggest regional concern – appear 
to be headed in a bilateral hub-and-spoke direction revolving around Brazil, not a 
potentially more efficient multilateral venture (Muggah and Diniz, 2013).  
 
Why rethink Autonomy? 
The question that arises from this brief survey is the extent to which Brazil‟s 
traditional approach to autonomy and sovereignty contradicts or retards the country‟s 
ambitions for regional and global positioning and leadership. Make no mistake, South 
America is tremendously important for Brazil not only in a traditional security sense 
and as a platform for global political credibility, but also as a critical export market for 
employment generating manufacturing industries and growing levels of out-bound 
Brazilian foreign direct investment. Worryingly, Brazil appears to be losing its South 
American market share (Jenkins, 2014). 
With leadership comes responsibility, even if this responsibility is unstated. The 
lesson from recent history appears to be that concrete actions to take on leadership in 
the region and gain its acceptance would require Brazil to assume substantial 
proportions of the costs of providing various collective goods. Even if not resulting in 
direct economic costs, this would create political commitments and start to impose 
norms and expectations of behavior that would restrain Brazil‟s free space for action. In 
simple realist terms this means autonomy would be restrained and sovereignty 
comprised.  
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Active leadership, then, appears to raise questions about autonomy for Brazil, 
whether it be in terms of how Brazil might intervene/influence other countries or 
delegate powers to institutions. This in turn directly creates constraints stemming from 
required and expected action. Absent clear political instruction to pursue such a 
sovereignty-impinging policy track, Itamaraty has done precisely what a good 
bureaucracy should do in a democracy: it has stayed within its existing political remit 
for policy innovation and action. The very fact that there is a vibrant scholarly and 
policy discussion about disappointments and limitations in Brazilian leadership strongly 
suggests that Itamaraty has been tremendously successful at fulfilling its brief. 
Nevertheless, while the regional ambience has remained remarkably civil and the other 
continental presidents will without fail take the Brazilian president‟s phone calls, the 
negative reaction to a stuttering continental leadership project has been unequivocal. 
Differences in vision and regional expectations contributed to Chile, Peru and Colombia 
joining with Mexico to form the Pacific Alliance, which Paraguay and Uruguay would 
both like to join to address their long-standing goals of reducing dependence on Brazil. 
Although by some interpretations Mercosul is going from success to success as a 
regional market now encompassing nearly 80% of South America‟s GDP (for example, 
see Pereira, 2014) with ambitions for more if Brazil‟s idea of a Pacific Alliance-
Mercosul trade deal comes to pass, some of Mercosul‟s historically most forceful 
Brazilian advocates are raising pointed questions and arguing the bloc is riven by 
bilateral disputes and a lack of generalized confidence in its institutional procedures (for 
example, see Barbosa, 2014; Gonçalves, 2013). 
The tight focus on a defensive approach to autonomy and sovereignty is having 
wider implications, too. In the international arena other long-standing, globally engaged 
actors are sometimes left wondering why such a domestically strong proponent of 
human rights and democracy would resist international efforts to curb the sorts of 
abuses recently seen in Syria or along the border between Russia and the Ukraine. For 
those who take the time to look into the theoretical works underpinning Itamaraty 
decision-making the question becomes even more perplexing when set in the context of 
writings such as those by Celso Lafer (2001) and Gelson Fonseca (2004) dealing with 
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identity and foreign policy formation, a theme that was also set in the bedrock of post-
Cold War foreign policy thinking in the 1993 foreign policy review (IPRI, 1993: 59-61). 
While it is still pushing the point to characterize Brazil as a country clinically following 
what John Odell (2000) would characterize as a „distributive‟ negotiating strategy by 
quietly refusing to make concessions that threaten the autonomy principle and might 
weaken the sovereignty norm, some established international actors and members of the 
Northern media are getting confused with the Brazilian approach and starting to 
informally use this language(on the trade file, for example, see Feinberg, 1997; 
Barbosa, 2011: chapter 1; Amorim, 2011: chapter 19). 
The suggestion here is not that Brazil should abandon protection of its autonomy 
and vouchsafing of the international norm of sovereignty as core foreign policy 
concepts. All states do this to one degree or another depending on their power resources 
and capabilities. Nor is the suggestion that Brazil should wantonly break its 
commitments or violate international law whenever it suits its purposes as some other 
countries appear to do. Rather, the proposition is that maintaining the current 
understanding of autonomy and sovereignty guiding Brazilian foreign policy does carry 
costs, which in turn are creating and perpetuating some of the recurring bilateral and 
regional policy challenges that preoccupy policy makers, scholars, business, civil 
society, and commentators. The applied policy question to ask is if the costs generated 
by the existing approach to autonomy and sovereignty remain acceptable. 
 
Conclusion: Enter the Politicians 
The only recommendation this analytical survey offers is that there be a 
discussion about what the high level concepts of autonomy and sovereignty mean to 
contemporary Brazil and how this should be reflected in Brazilian foreign policy. This 
article has taken a devil‟s advocate approach in order to provoke, suggesting that 
perhaps there is a need for a more „creative‟ or „flexible‟ approach to autonomy and 
sovereignty. But equally compelling arguments can be made for maintaining the status 
quo. No vision of what a possible revised understanding might mean has been set forth 
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in these pages, only the proposition that there are costs to the current approach, which 
may also be the best option for Brazil.  
What is dangerous is not having the discussion because the international and 
domestic context under which these guiding principles were set down has changed 
notably since the start of the PT governments, let alone Cardoso‟s 1993 foreign policy 
review or even the time when Rio Branco ran Brazil‟s foreign relations at the start of the 
Twentieth Century. While Itamaraty has already taken an important step in this 
direction with the public consultations it held in March, 2014, and the advancement of 
internal thinking on foreign policy and democracy (Patriota, 2013; Mourão, 2013), 
comprehensive treatment of this and other core conceptual issues requires political 
engagement because the decisions must reflect the interests, ethical and identity 
understandings Brazilians hold about themselves, their country, and its place in the 
region and world. In a democracy one of the key functions of elected representatives is 
to reflect the interests, ethics and identity of a country in its highest decision-making 
institutions. As apt as Itamaraty has proven at discerning these key foreign policy inputs 
over the years, which makes diplomats invaluable participants in the discussion, 
members of the foreign service are not elected officials and arguably not particularly 
representative of large parts of the wider Brazilian population.  
The questions here are not just for the professionals and specialists. Rather, these 
are highly political questions about the broad outlines of what Brazil wants to be and do 
– a discussion about whether or not Brazil wants to change its position in the world. 
There are increasingly large potential risks and consequences for a wide range of 
interests and actors in Brazil in either change or continuation of the core conceptual 
understandings driving Itamaraty‟s actions. The president sets the tone and has to give 
clear political direction and backing (and respect) to the foreign minister, something that 
was clearly evident during the Cardoso and Lula years, but seemed to slip inexplicably 
under Dilma either by intent or lack of interest. Perhaps more significantly, Congress 
has to do its part by taking foreign affairs seriously and putting pressure on the president 
for sustained good policy. In part this might involve not only more vigorous 
interrogation of diplomats and representations before its two standing committees, but 
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also by increasing transparency by making in camera sessions the exception, not the 
regular rule – a survey of Brazilian Congressional committee transcripts stands in stark 
contrast to those from countries such as the USA, Canada, or the UK, each a country 
that parallels aspects of Brazil‟s emerging global role. While politics may still remain 
resoundingly local, the impact of foreign affairs is no longer felt solely abroad and the 
necessary expertise restricted to the foreign ministry. The challenge for the winner of 
the October presidential ballot and for Brazil‟s elected representatives is to recognize 
this and engage with the international dimension of their particular policy concerns and 
their foreign policy implications. 
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Abstract 
One of the central foreign policy challenges that will confront the victor of October 
presidential election is how to make this area of public policy relevant and of interest to 
Brazilian politicians and the wider public. This article addresses this challenge by 
arguing that it is time for Brazilians to re-examine what is meant by autonomy and 
sovereignty within the context for their country‟s foreign policy. No policy 
prescriptions or interpretations are offered. Attention is instead focused on arguing that 
the national, regional and global context has changed, making reflexive adherence to 
pre-existing conceptual understandings is dangerous and does carry costs. If nothing is 
to change, the article argues, this should be a conscious choice that comes from 
politically and publicly engaged debate, which in turn will provide Itamaraty with the 
direction and support it needs to continue advancing Brazil‟s national interest. 
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Resumo 
Um dos desafios centrais da política externa que o vitorioso das eleições presidenciais 
de outubro enfrentará é como tornar esta área da política pública relevante de interesse 
para os políticos e para o público brasileiro. Este artigo trata deste desafio, 
argumentando que é o momento dos brasileiros reexaminarem o que é entendido por 
autonomia e soberania dentro do contexto da política externa do país.  
Não são oferecidas prescrições políticas ou interpretações. Ao contrário,  a atenção é 
focada em argumentar que o contexto nacional, regional e global mudou, tornando a 
adesão a elementos conceituais pré-existentes  perigosa  potencialmente custosa. Se não 
houver nada para mudar, o artigo argumenta, isso deve ser uma escolha consciente que 
vem de debate político e público envolvido, que por sua vez irá proporcionar ao 
Itamaraty a direção e o apoio de que necessita para continuar avançando no interesse 
nacional do Brasil. 
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